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ABSTRACT 
This article studies the cross-country differences in work ethic and claims that different political 
regimes transmitted different work ethics that still persist today. Using the World Values Survey 
and starting our political regime analysis in 1900, we find that Democratic regimes promote 
more effectively work relevance and competitiveness than Autocratic and Anocratic regimes, 
and that the political regime history of the country is more important than the present level of 
democracy. Moreover, we prove that this differences were transmitted through generations by 
parents, who optimally choose what work ethic to transmit taking into account their own values. 
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1. Introduction  
Central to a great deal of research from a wide variety of academic disciplines is the relationship 
between values, attitudes and behaviour, and their tremendous spatial variation across countries 
and regions. Recent literature has been increasingly recognising the influence of norms on 
economic behaviour, with attention concentrated both on ethics, regarded as normalized norms 
and social norms, upheld by the agreement or condemnation of others. A vast literature has 
been demonstrating that cultural values are an enduring and autonomous influence on society; 
consequently, in long-term perspectives, it is of interest to endogenize norms, explain how they 
emerge, upheld and change.2 Culture and its effects on labour markets is at the heart of 
economic analysis, in that sense, it is important to have a better understanding what are the 
driving forces behind the different work attitudes that end up leading to diverse economic 
outcomes across countries. 3 
This work compares the economically-relevant values transmitted in the past by democratic 
and non-democratic regimes based on predictions that stem from differences in the political 
regime and societal organization. In particular, it argues that different behaviours and values 
that were transmitted by the political regimes in the past still fit in the present with differences 
in beliefs and in the enforcement mechanisms that characterize them. Comparative to non-
democracy, democracy augments the voice of the great number of poor to that of the few rich, 
permitting to change the composition of the citizenry influencing the political process; also, it 
reduces the discretionary nature of power in the sense that political decisions become more 
responsive to constraints beyond the control of politicians (Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001). This 
differences affected a number of factors that impinge on individual success and how institutions 
                                                          
2 See for instance Alesina et al. (2015), Algan and Cahuc (2009), Giuliano (2007), Luttmer and Singhal (2009), 
among many others. This literature proves that cultural values persists among generations even if individuals move 
to other countries. 
3 Aghion et al. (2011), Algan and Cahuc (2009), Giavazzi et al. (2013) and Michau (2009) are a few examples. 
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and the economy work. In particular, while democracy favours pluralism and organisational 
infrastructure, non-democracy limits or even forbids pluralism. Following this line of reasoning 
we test the hypothesis to which the work ethic produced by the political regimes in the past still 
has an effect in the present using two waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), 2005-2009 
and 2010-2014, denoted henceforth 2005 and 2010, covering 47 countries, and approximately 
34000 individuals. In particular, starting the analysis in 1900 and finishing in the year of the 
survey wave, we studied the effects of democracies, autocracies and anocracies in the current 
work ethic; to our knowledge, this is the first attempt in trying to explain the spatial variation 
in work ethic across countries through the political regime history of a country. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a framework for analysing 
the effects of regime types on work ethic based on a typology of enforcement systems and their 
transmission through generations. Section 3 describes the WVS data, the specific variables 
employed and the statistical regressions used to test the hypothesis. Section 4 presents and 
discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Analytical Framework 
2.1.  Comparative Analysis of Regime System Enforcements 
In all societies there is a branch of rules of behaviour based on ideas about what is morally good 
and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice, justice and crime. This rules that compose the ethic 
of a society are defined and enforced by different means, such as the regime that governs a 
country. Following Arruñada (2009), we distinguish three types of structures to which party is 
responsible for enforcing norms and rules in a given interaction. 4 
                                                          
4 Although Arruñada (2009) studied the Protestant work ethic, he started from three standard enforcement types 
that can also be applied in the case of regime systems. 
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Under ‘first party’ enforcement, individuals evaluate their behaviour in relation to their own 
reading of a moral code that includes several economically-relevant preferences towards effort, 
thriftiness and so on. Tocqueville (1835) is often credited for first noting the relationship 
between democracy and work ethic. During his visit to the United States he wrote his most 
notable work Democracy in America [1835], where he contrasted the case of American 
democratic people where every man worked to earn a living and hard-work and money-making 
was the dominant ethic, with the aristocratic ethic in France with hereditary wealth, by 
promoting equal opportunities, wealth was available to the ones who worked hard, favouring 
an increase in the labour supply and a work ethic that favoured effort, leading individuals to 
concentrate on productive activities and abandon unproductive ones.  
However, the degree of motivation on work provided by Democracy in comparison with 
dictatorial regimes is open to doubt. Linz (1975) claims that Authoritarian regimes promote the 
idea that citizens should concentrate on work and family, and leave the politics to the 
government, while Lane (1990) highlights that Communist societies develop a work ethic that 
glorifies labour during the processes of rapid industrialization. 
‘Second party’ enforcement is related with the verification and sanction by the party 
suffering the consequences of breach. Partners and peers are second parties as they exert 
pressure on non-compliant members through different modes such as shaming, ostracising or 
even killing. Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) claim that norms are tied to outcomes and this norms 
are more felt intensively as more people adhere to it, as it was observed by Tocqueville in the 
case of hard work in America. Under dictatorial regimes populations are encouraged to 
denounce peers or even family that do not meet with the norms and rules of the system in order 
to this ones being punished, generating low levels of trust and social capital. In contrast, 
individuals in democracies generally accept values that are related with passivity, toleration, 
communication and deliberation. 
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Lastly, under ‘third party’ enforcement, specialized agents such as political rulers, judges or 
police forces, verify the behaviour of citizens and punish those who do not follow the rules. 
Linz (1975) pointed out that Totalitarian and Authoritarian regimes (two forms of dictatorship) 
try to homogenise the society and mobilise the population to actively support the regime and 
learn/being subject of the discipline of the state, although the state is less active in the degree 
of social pluralism and mobilisation in Authoritarian regimes. In more homogeneous societies 
it is likely that individuals will have low preferences for competition. The discipline of the state 
is maintained through repression, being carried out by secret police forces, army, paramilitary 
groups or death squads. Relatively to democracy, democratic institutions increase the costs of 
using repressive behaviour because if actions are inappropriate, authorities can be voted out of 
office (Davenport, 2007).  
To the extent that the discipline of the state in Autocratic regimes is completely effective is 
not so clear since it offers low work incentives. Individuals are expected to work hard due to 
altruism for their country, with low individual compensations; also, at high levels of inequality, 
work motivation is low because the wealth is concentrated in the elite. Fehr and Falk (2002) 
demonstrated that the framing of an incentive in terms of extra rewards elicits more effort 
compared to a frame in terms of punishment, even if in the end the total compensation is 
identical. Lin (1988) and Nolan (1988) declare that in the case of the collective agriculture in 
China, collective farms were not viable institutions, as they failed to effectively link effort with 
reward, failing to provide strong work incentives to farm workers. Consequently, we predict 
that democracy is more effective in transmitting a “good” work ethic than autocratic regimes. 
Though, it is plausible that autocracies transmit more effectively a good work ethic than 
anocracies, which are characterised by “politically weak central governments” with “weak local 
policing or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices” (Fearon and Latin, 2003).  
7 
 
2.2.  The transmission of the work ethic through generations 
To analyse how work values evolve endogenously, we follow the work of Tabellini (2008). 
Assuming imperfect empathy, parents optimally choose what work ethic to transmit to their 
children by evaluating their children’s welfare with their own values, reflecting held moral 
convictions or beliefs, which are not randomly chosen to suit children’s tastes. The assumption 
of imperfect empathy implies that the equilibrium will be both backward- and forward-looking. 
Backward-looking first because the parents’ values influence their educational choices. Algan 
and Cahuc (2009) provided empirical evidence of this, by using the same question about the 
willingness to cheat on benefits, and demonstrated that, on average, a citizen tends to provide 
the same answer as someone living in his country of origin, showing the relevance of cultural 
transmission from one generation to the other and suggesting the important role played by 
parents in this process. In consequence, values evolve gradually over time and reflect historical 
features of the external environment. Also forward-looking since parents adapt their 
educational choices to the future environment of their children. Bisin and Verdier (2004), by 
driving their results by the voting process, demonstrated that if the majority of agents have a 
high work ethic, low distribution will be implemented by politicians, encouraging a high work 
ethic, however, if most part of the agents have a low work ethic, redistribution will be high and 
have a low work ethic will be more attractive. Following this reasoning and assuming that 
parents will take into account the institutional enforcement when they choose what values to 
transmit, countries where the majority of the population has low work ethic will enter in a ‘low 
work ethic trap’ while in countries where the majority of the population has a high work ethic 






3.1.  Data and Sample 
The tests rely on several econometric models built with cross-section data from the World 
Values Survey (WVS).  The WVS is a worldwide project carried out by social scientists that 
explores people’s values and beliefs and allows to study what social and political impacts they 
might have had. This work concentrates only on the last two waves available: 2005 and 2010, 
including 79 countries and more than 169000 individuals. The WVS contains only few 
questions related with work ethic and these questions are only sporadically included in the 
surveys and not always the same; concentrating in the last two waves has two main benefits: 
first, it permits to study the relationship between the regime history of a country since the XXth 
century and the work ethic in XXIth century; second, two important questions regarding the 
citizenship of the parents of the individual surveyed were just included in the last two waves, 
permitting to control for vertical transmission and allowing for a better estimation. 
 
3.2.  Tests 
3.2.1. Work Ethic 
The work ethic hypothesis will be tested by examining how Autocratic, Anocratic and 
Democratic regimes compare in three dimensions: 
(1) Work importance. The first question asks directly how important is work in the 
individual’s life and can take values from 1 to 4 (with 1 being very important and 4 not 
important at all), we called the variable “Work important”. The second question 
examines the opinion of the respondent about changes in our way of live that could take 
place in the near future: “Less importance placed on work in our lives”, taking the 
values from 1 to 3, with 1 being good, 2 don’t mind and 3 bad, we called the variable 
“Importance of work in the future”. 
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(2) Competitiveness is the answer to the question from 1 to 10, where 1 is “Competition is 
good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas.” and 10 is “Competition 
is harmful. It brings out the worst in people.”. 
(3) Willingness to work hard is the answer to the question from 1 to 10, where 1 is “In the 
long run, hard work usually brings a better life.” and 10 is “Hard work doesn’t 
generally bring success – it’s more a matter of luck and connections.”. 
All the questions were recoded, with the exception of the variable “Importance of work in 
the future”, therefore a higher coefficient in all variables indicates a higher work ethic. Also, 
all the questions were normalized to take values between 0 and 1, to facilitate interpretation of 
the coefficients. 
3.2.2. The transmission of the work ethic through generations 
The WVS provides, among other things, a range of indicators on the qualities that children 
can be encouraged to learn at home. Three questions probes whether the respondent considered 
important to transmit qualities related with work ethic: hard work. feeling of responsibility and 
determination, perseverance (taking the value of 1 if it mentioned and 2 if not). The questions 
were recoded to take the value of 1 if it mentioned and 0 if not, and we called respectively 
“Hard work”, “Responsibility” and “Determination”. 
 
3.3.  Variables 
3.3.1. Main independent variables 
Different regimes led to the enforcement of different norms and rules. In order to take into 
account this effects, classification of the different regimes was performed using the Polity IV 
dataset. The Polity IV provides information for all countries since independence starting in 
1800, allowing to start our analysis in 1900. The Polity score ranges from -10 to +10, with -10 
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to -6 corresponding to autocracies, -5 to 5 corresponding to anocracies, 6 to 10 to democracies 
and three special values: -66, -77 and -88, which denote, respectively, cases of foreign 
“interruption”, anarchy and “transition”.  Using this classification and analysing the regime 
history of a country since 1900 until the year in which the wave was conducted, permitted to 
construct three variables for each country:  






, where 𝑖 represents country 𝑖; 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 takes values 0 or 1 if Polity scores between 
-10 and -6 in year 𝑡; 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 is the number of years analysed. 





 , where 
𝑖 represents country 𝑖; 𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 takes value 0 or 1 if Polity scores between -5 and 5 in 
year 𝑡; 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 is the number of years analysed. 





 , where 𝑖 
represents country 𝑖; 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 takes value 0 or 1 if Polity scores between 6 and 10 
in year 𝑡; 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 is the number of years analysed. 
As a consequence, the three variables take values between 0 and 1. No classification was used 
in the years that Polity scored special values. 
Two problems emerged during the construction of this variables. First, several of the 
countries in the sample just acquired independence during the period of analysis since before 
that they were part of other countries or territories, suffered (re)unifications, periods of invasion 
or even (re)conquests, and Polity just starts the classification in the year of independence. In 
order to solve this, we considered that the country had the same political regime as the country 
to which made part; for example, in the case of Serbia, between 1900 and 1914 Polity classifies 
all the years as it had an anocratic regime, however between 1921 and 2002 Serbia was part of 
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Yugoslavia, after 2003 it was part of Serbia and Montenegro, and since the separation of the 
two territories in 2006 it has been an independent country; another example can be Georgia, 
which was part of the Russian Empire between 1900 and 1918, in 1918 it won independence, 
having been conquered in 1922 by the Soviet Union and finally declared independence in 1991.5 
Second, the sample included former colonies; creating a new variable that had a similar 
procedure as the other main variables and took into account the colonial history of the country 
would not be completely correct and could “contaminate” the results; Europeans adopted 
different colonization policies, creating different institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001), leading 
to different ‘third party’ enforcements, therefore, constructing a variable that would consider 
this institutions as equal would be wrong, subsequently it was necessary to remove from the 
sample former colonies (more specifically, 26 countries); the effects of different types of 
colonization on work ethic will be left for future research.  
In order to study for the relation between the present democracy level of the country and the 
work ethic, a forth variable was added to our specification: 
(4) Democracy: which was created using the Polity score in the year of the wave that varied 
between -10 and 10, the variable was normalized to take values within 0 and 1.  
A few countries surveyed in the WVS, such as e.g. Tunisia in 2013, were scored with special 
values in the year of the wave, therefore, this countries were removed from my sample, 
remaining in the end with 47 countries. 6 After dropping observations with missing values in 
the independent variables, approximately 34000 observations remained. 
 
                                                          
5 Although Georgia and Ukraine were independent between 1918 and 1921, we did not classify the regime type 
during those years, since Polity does not provide any classification. 




3.4. Main model 
To perform the tests, the following equations will be estimated: 
(1) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 +
∑ (𝛾𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙) + ∑ (𝜌𝑜𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)𝑜 +𝑡
∑ (𝛿𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠) + ∑ (𝜑𝑣𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠) +𝑣𝑟  
where each dependent variable, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents a value or action, as stated by respondents to the 
survey. Variables that measure work importance, competitiveness and willingness to work hard 
are expressed in terms of categories with a natural order, and so ordered probit models are 
estimated for this cases; while the variables that measure the transmission of the work ethic on 
children only took two values and in these cases probit models are used. All equations were 
estimated with robust standard errors. Independent variables, besides the already specified, are 
as follows: 
 Individual controls were introduced for the sex of respondents, their age, religion (a vast 
literature has been testing the Protestant Weber’s hypothesis, that implies a positive 
correlation between religious beliefs and work ethic, with a positive correlation between 
work versus leisure for protestants), level of education, income scale, political 
orientation, employment status (in order to minimize the risk that the answers simply 
reflect the personal labour market experience of the respondent), marital status, number 
of children and two important controls: if the mother and father of the respondent were 
citizens or immigrants in the country surveyed. 
 Country controls were also included: GDP per capita, GDP growth, unemployment rate, 
fractionalization ethnic (Alesina et al., 2003) and civil war. GDP per capita has a 
significant impact in predicting traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression 
values; also, economic development promotes self-expression values such as social 
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toleration and public expression while recessions lead to retrograde movements 
sponsoring survival values that are related with low levels of trust and tolerance 
(Inglehard and Baker, 2000). 7 Using the Correlates of War database, we constructed a 
variable that measures the total years of civil war in a country divided by the total years 
analysed (again, the analysis starts in 1900 and ends in the year of the wave); civil wars 
have direct economic and social costs, with these effects being highly persistent after 
the end of the war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), henceforth individuals will privilege 
more survival values. 
 Country and wave dummies which capture the role of specific national and time 
features. United States are considered as the reference group since this country always 
displayed a democratic regime and as referred by Tocqueville (1835) introduced a work 
ethic that privileged hard work. 
A summary statistics is provided in Table 1. 
 
4. Results 
4.1.  Work importance 
We start the analysis by assessing the relationship between the regime type and the importance 
that individuals give towards work. Table 2 reports the ordered probit estimates of the questions 
on work importance. 
Relatively to “Work important”, none of the main variables is statistically significant, as it 
is reported in column (1). However, this results are not completely disappointing to the extent 
that this type of question might not be the best measure to evaluate the individual importance  
                                                          




Table 1 – Summary statistics 
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towards work8. On average, individuals reported work being important in their life 0.812, in a 
scale that goes from 0 to 1, with a standard deviation of 0.263 (the lowest of all questions 
analysed), it is plausible that individuals over-valued work in their life for ‘political 
correctness’. The second question “Importance of work in the future” seems to be a better 
measure of personal work importance since it permits to estimate the opportunity cost of 
working in relation with leisure. Relatively to column (2) Democracy history has a positive 
coefficient, significant at the 5% level, meaning that the longer is the duration of a democracy 
in a country, the more individuals give importance to work, relative to autocracies. Anocracy 
history has a negative coefficient, although not statistically significant. It is interesting to note 
that although Democracy has also a positive coefficient it is not statistically significant and its 
value is considerably lower than Democracy history, proving that it is the history that matters.  
 
4.2. Competitiveness and willingness to work hard 
Table 3 presents the results with respect of considerations about competition and hard work. In 
Table 3 column (1) reports the results when “Competitiveness” is the dependent variable. The 
results confirm our predictions. First, Democracy history has a positive sign and significant at 
5% level, while Democracy has also a positive coefficient although much smaller and not 
statistically significant, supporting the idea that the longer is the duration of a democracy, the 
more competitive are individuals on work (in relation with autocracy). Second, Anocracy 
history has a strong negative sign significant at the 10% level, showing that the work ethic 
transmitted by Autocratic regimes is still passed, although less effective than in Democratic 
regimes. 
 
                                                          
8 Schwartz (1999) notes that self-reports questions are subject to distortion, with various features of the questions 
such as ambiguity and format readily producing unintended effects on subjects’ responses. 
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Table 2 – Work importance 
 Work important 
 
(1) 
































































-.140 *** (.033) 
 
Reference 
-.121 *** (.021) 
.007 (.022) 
-.253 *** (.024) 
 
Reference 
-.099 *** (.018) 
-.012 (.017) 
.048 ** (.016) 









.091 * (.036) 
.053 * (.023) 
.216 *** (.047) 
.017 (.107) 
.021 (.219) 













-.128 *** (.017) 
.021 (.016) 
.021 (.016) 










-.0002 *** (.00005) 
-.038 *** (.008) 
-.035 * (.016) 
9.057 * (3.569) 
-4.062 (3.330) 
 
-.0001 *** (.00005) 
.004 (.008) 
-.024 (.017) 














Source: WVS and WB. ***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Ordered probit models. 
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The results reported in column (2) that test the individual willingness to work hard and the 
belief that hard work brings a better life do not support our work ethic hypothesis, as none of 
the coefficients of the independent variables that measure the regime history are statistically 
significant. It is plausible that the unemployment conjuncture in the country or the employment 
status is removing some significance in our main variables, as they are especially important in 
this type of questions. Long and frequent spells of unemployment change the values of the 
unemployed (Lindbeck et al., 1999; Clark, 2003). Still, Democracy is positive and significant 
at the 1%, meaning that democratic regimes promote hard work through the incentive of making 
wealth available to the ones that work hard. 
 
4.3. The transmission of the work ethic through generations 
Table 4 reports probit estimates of the variables that test what qualities, related with work ethic, 
children should be encouraged at home. Results clearly confirm our predictions that parents 
that live in countries with longer durations of democracy transmit higher levels of work ethic 
to their children than in autocracies or anocracies, leaving to the persistence of these values 
through generations. 
First, relatively to hard work, in column (1), Democracy history has a positive coefficient 
and significant at 1% level, meaning that the longer is the democratic history of a country, the 
more are individuals willing to transmit to their children the value of hard work, in relation with 
autocratic regimes. Anocracy history has a positive sign although not statistically significant. 
Second, in column (2), the results are similar to the ones obtained in column (1). The longer 
is the duration of democracy in a country, the more willing are individuals to transmit to their 
children values related with the feeling of responsibility. In this specification, Anocracy history 
has a negative sign even though not statistically significant. 
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Table 3 – Competitiveness and willingness to work hard 
 Competitiveness 
(1) 









3.216 ** (1.166) 






































.098 *** (.012) 




.106 *** (.029) 







.077 *** (.020) 




-.067 *** (.018) 
.024 (.018) 
-.087 *** (.019) 
 
Reference 
-.070 *** (.015) 











.141 *** (.029) 
.044 * (.020) 
.157 *** (.042) 
.086 (.101) 
.047 (.237) 
.068 *** (.020) 
 
Reference 
-.038 * (.020) 
-.010 (.022) 





-.050 * (.019) 
 
Reference 
-.061 *** (.015) 
.031 * (.014) 
.036 ** (.013) 










-.0001 ** (.00004) 
-.009 (.007) 
-.034 * (.014) 
-5.968 * (2.704) 
7.542 ** (2.620) 
 
-.0001 *** (.00004) 
-.049 *** (.006) 
-.051 *** (.014) 
5.696 * (2.720) 













Source: WVS and WB. ***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Ordered probit models. 
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Third, in column (3) we test the hypothesis of transmitting determination, perseverance 
values to the children. Democracy history has a strong positive sign, yet not statistically 
significant. Anocracy history has a robust negative sign significant at the 10% level, meaning 
that the longer is the duration of an Anocratic regime, the less disposed are parents to transmit 
values related with determination to their children. 
It is also noteworthy to compare the size of the estimated Democracy history coefficient with 
that of the Democracy, which is always smaller in all specifications, meaning that what is more 
relevant in the transmission of work ethic values is the regime history of the country and not 
the present level of democracy. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
These results suffer several limitations. First of all, correlation does not imply causation. 
Although we attenuate this problem by including country and wave dummies, it is possible that 
hidden variables may be affecting both our main variables and other values. In cross-sectional 
analysis it is difficult to control for all the factors that might be correlated with the work ethic, 
political system, level of freedom, etc., since this factors are endogenously determined and 
influenced by geography, history and institutions. However, focusing our analysis in just one 
country, would turn difficult to generalise, as a country might have some characteristics that 
other countries do not necessarily share; concentrating in the characteristics that all autocratic, 
anocratic and democratic regimes have in all countries allows us to apply our work ethic 
hypothesis to all countries. 
Second, the data are built from statements on values instead of observations on actual 
behaviour. It is expected some bias caused by a certain tendency to lie because of ‘political 
correctness’ (for example, whether one considers work important or not). Nonetheless, given 
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Table 4 - Qualities that children can be encouraged at home 













7.489 *** (1.868) 
2.048 (2.240) 
3.600 *** (.243) 
 
Reference 
5.335 ** (1.936) 
-.668 (2.327) 




-5.221 * (2.063) 
































.113 *** (.016) 












-.135 *** (.025) 




-.076 ** (.025) 
-.040 (.023) 
-.087 *** (.025) 
 
Reference 







-.119 *** (.016) 
.003 *** (.001) 
 
Reference 










.214 *** (.029) 
.069 * (.037) 
 
Reference 





-.076 *** (.021) 
-.053 ** (.018) 
.048 ** (.018) 














-.069 ** (.025) 
 
Reference 
.189 *** (.024) 
.296 *** (.027) 






















-.0001 * (.0001) 
-.034 *** (.009) 
.028 (.018) 












.024 ** (.008) 
.017 (.017) 
-11.263 ** (3.827) 
 

















Source: WVS and WB. ***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Robust standard 




that our work focuses on differences between the political regimes, the bias only matters if the 
three political regimes lead to a variation in the proclivity to lying. 
Third, we assumed that the political regime in each year has the same impact on current work 
ethic, which might not be necessarily true even considering that norms and values change 
slowly; political regimes during the second half of the XXth century have possibly more impact 
on current work ethic than political regimes during the first half. However, to the extent that we 
do not have data available during the complete XXth century and do not precisely know how 
values evolve over time, it is not possible to give different weights to the impacts of political 
regimes over time. 
Lastly, we did not account for variation within the regime type, e.g. anocratic regimes with 
the classification of -5 are not necessarily equal in terms of repression and tolerance as regimes 
with the classification of 5, as the first ones might have features more related with autocratic 
regimes and the last ones with democratic. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper argues that the type of political regime is a key ingredient in the explanation of 
different work attitudes across countries. Overall, the article supports a “democratic work 
ethic”, by which citizens in a democratic country tend to value more work and be more 
competitive than in autocratic or anocratic countries. By permitting equal opportunities and 
access to wealth for the ones who work hard, it provides incentives to develop a high work 
ethic; on the other hand, autocratic regimes are less effective in transmitting a high “work ethic” 
as individual benefits are low and individuals are expected to work for altruism for their 
country. Assuming imperfect empathy, this differences in work values tend to persist, as parents 
optimally choose what values to transmit to their children, by evaluating their children welfare 
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with their own values and taking into account the future environment; more specifically, we 
proved that in democratic regimes, parents have more tendency to transmit the values of hard 
work, responsibility and determination. We theorized that the longer is the period of length of 
the regime type, the stronger is its effect on work ethic, being more significant the duration of 
the regime than the actual level of democracy in the country. Anocratic regimes, which are 
characterised by political instability and ineffectiveness, were found to be the ones who transmit 
the worst work ethic. 
Our work has several implications. For example, Brügger et al. (2009) found that differences 
in culture explain differences in unemployment duration on the order of 20%, in that sense, in 
countries where democratic regimes have a longer duration, individuals are more likely to have 
shorter periods of unemployment. Zhan (2015) found that cultural attitudes play a significant 
role in occupational choices, in this case, in longer-length democratic countries individuals will 
favour jobs where there is high competition and individual ambition and success are highly 
valued, making their industries more adaptable and responsive to changing environments, on 
the other hand, in longer-length autocratic and anocratic countries individuals will prefer jobs 
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